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Dualism and Equality in the New Constitution
MICHEL BASTARACHE*
The need for constitutional reform has brought to light the 
fundamental problem of defining the concept of dualism in Canada 
and deciding how it should be reflected in political institutions and the 
distribution of powers. The author indicates here the wide implications 
of dualism as understood by the Acadian people and shows how this 
concept could translate into the political realities of tomorrow.
La nécessite' d'une réforme constitutionnelle n’est pas sans créer 
certains problèmes fondamentaux. Entre autres, comment définir le 
concept du dualisme au Canada? De quelle façon ce concept devrait-il 
se refléter dans les institutions politiques et sur le partage des 
pouvoirs? C’est ce que l’auteur tente de caractériser en indiquant, 
d’une part, quelles sont les nombreuses implications du dualisme tel 
que le conçoit le peuple acadien et en démontrant, d’autre part, 
comment ce concept pourrait se manifester dans les réalités politiques 
de demain.
INTRODUCTION
Despite the eagerness o f the prem ier o f New Brunswick to tackle 
publicly the problem of constitutional reform, despite the establishment 
of constitutional committees by the provincial legislatures in New 
Brunswick and Nova Scotia, and despite the public meetings held in 
New Brunswick by la Fédération des francophones hors Quebec along with 
those held earlier by the Task Force on Canadian Unity, it would be a 
mistake to believe that the Atlantic region has come to grips with this 
important question. Even the referendum  debate, which inspired many 
detailed articles in the Quebec press and in specialized publications, has 
not led to a heightened awareness. The subdued role of the media in 
the Atlantic region is partly responsible for this, but there is good reason 
to be even more concerned with the apparent lack o f foresight, 
commitment, and vision demonstrated by our political parties. In short, 
no one has yet seriously examined the potential impact o f the various 
reform options on the Atlantic communities, and no one has attempted 
to exert an influence, on behalf o f these communities, on the debate in 
progress.
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I wish to examine constitutional reform and the distribution of 
power in the future constitution from the perspective o f dualism in the 
Canadian and Atlantic societies. I will try to demonstrate how this 
problem, which is the nx>t of the present crisis, will probably have a 
determinative effect on the success or failure of the reform undertaken.
I will also attempt to show that the way in which this aspect o f the 
Canadian reality is dealt with can have a serious impact on the future of 
the Atlantic region.
THE CONCEPT OF DUALISM
We are becoming increasingly accustomed to political commentators 
who draw distinctions between the approach of the federal Liberal Party, 
which recommends constitutional recognition of the fundamental 
linguistic rights of Canadian citizens, and that of the Parti Québécois, 
which advocates recognition o f the collective right of Quebecers to 
choose a political system establishing their equality of status. In addition 
to the fact that the first approach is based on the recognition of 
individual rights while the second favours collective rights, the two 
approaches are also dissimilar in that they take into account two basically 
different communities — one consisting of Francophones and 
Anglophones throughout Canada, and the other consisting o f Canadians 
and Quebecers. The first approach also tends to establish a preference 
for the recognition of linguistic communities, while the second uses the 
broader sociological definition of “national” communities. These 
distinctions are not the result of a confusion in terms, but rather of 
different conceptions of society, its needs, and the role o f the State. And 
yet the Task Force on Canadian Unity believed it was important to 
clarify the vocabulary used in the debate; consequently, it made a 
fundamental distinction between cultural dualism, which “besides 
demographic evidence . . .  is often supported by a num ber of historical, 
legal and political concepts such as ‘the two founding peoples’, the 
‘compact theory of Confederation’, ‘the two nations’, and ‘equal 
partnership’ ”* and political dualism, which takes into account the special 
position of Quebec within the Canadian federation.2
Without retracing the history of The British North America Act3 or 
analyzing the demographic and social data which substantiate the 
present existence of two national communities, it may be useful to 
determine the extent to which the definitions o f dualism (stated above) 
correspond with or differ from the perception o f dualism prevalent in
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the Atlantic region. First o f all it must be emphasized that Acadians and 
Anglophones in this region, from the beginning, developed a distinct 
collective personality, one that was not founded exclusively on linguistic 
factors. The immigration o f people o f all nationalities during the 20th 
century did not change the socio-linguistic profile o f the Atlantic region 
and did not create, as in the West, a new challenge to Canadian 
federalism. This is, doubtless, the reason for the indifference shown in 
the East to the federal government’s multiculturalism policy. It would 
seem that Acadians and Anglophones believe that integration of 
immigrants has been achieved without transforming the essential 
characteristics or homogeneity of the two original communities (other 
than the American Indians, of course). Therefore, there is in the 
Atlantic region an awareness not only of a bicultural society on the 
national level, but an awareness as well of a very special Quebec 
community, since Francophones in the Atlantic region are considered 
and consider themselves to be different from Quebec Francophones.
It is not the Maritime Provinces that are demanding fundamental 
constitutional reform. Rather it would seem that reform is sought not by 
those with special economic problems, but by those with enough power 
to make themselves more autonomous, either economically or culturally, 
in the future. Perhaps it is for this reason that, notwithstanding the 
existing image of the structure o f society, Anglophones in the Atlantic 
region find it extremely difficult to accept the advent o f a dualism which 
would transform existing social and political relationships. The reasons 
are twofold: Francophones do not exercise much political or economic 
influence in the region, and the Quebec problem is viewed as one 
concerning relationships between states or governments only.
It should be emphasized that, while the Acadians and other 
Francophones outside Quebec recognize the special nature of Quebec 
society and the validity of the efforts o f the Quebec government to 
obtain a greater degree o f autonomy, the majority o f them also believe 
that Canada will be viable as a federal state if it can agree to incorporate 
cultural dualism into its laws and institutions. This dualism, however, 
cannot be limited to the constitutional recognition of linguistic rights; it 
must extend to the recognition o f distinct national communities to 
ensure them true legal status, cultural security, and representativeness. 
If we look for a solution to this problem solely in the division o f powers, 
then we accept a situation whereby Quebecers identify exclusively with 
their provincial government and increasingly view the federal 
government as foreign, and a situation in which national minorities 
dispute the legitimacy of governments which ignore their collective 
interests and condone their assimilation. If  we attempt to limit dualism 
to the granting of linguistic guarantees, we will be ignoring the fact that 
Quebecers, even when well represented in federal institutions, continue 
to decry their economic inferiority and their inability to change the 
orientation of federal policies. It would also be a mistake to believe that
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there exists a true dualism able to provide Quebecers with equal status 
solely as a result o f the assurances o f the federal government to 
redistribute the national wealth, or to appoint a large num ber of 
French-speaking civil servants, especially if this is done unilaterally. The 
cause of the constitutional crisis is not the demands of Western 
provinces for control over natural resources, the cause is an identity 
crisis framed in terms o f dualism.
DEMANDS OF CANADIAN DUALISM
The significance o f Canadian dualism has been examined by most
constitutional law authors, and can be summarized in two basic
principles: cultural security and political representation o f the two 
national linguistic communities.
Cultural security is the commitment of the State to protect the 
language and culture of the two national communities and to provide 
them with the means essential for their economic, social, and cultural 
development. With this in mind, it must be emphasized that there is no 
agreement in Canada on the means of ensuring such cultural security 
or, indeed, whether to first ensure security o f the individual or o f the 
community. But the difficulty which results from a confrontation 
between the Parti Québécois option, which sees the Quebec community 
as an equal partner with Canada, and the federalist option, which wants 
to reconcile the interests of the Canadian nation and those of the 
Province o f Quebec by broadening individual protections and 
readjusting the division o f powers between Ottawa and the provinces, is 
not the only problem which must be faced. There are also the two 
opposing concepts of federalism which were symbolized by the decisions 
o f Léon Dion and Jean-Paul L’Allier to join the Yes forces in the 
referendum  campaign. Both opponents o f the Quebec Liberal Party’s 
Beige Paper object to the domination o f Quebec by the Ottawa 
government, even with increased delegation by Ottawa to Quebec o f the 
right to exercise federal powers. Mr. L’Allier stated: “In cultural matters, 
more specifically, the right to veto, either directly or by a provincial 
House, will not suffice. Just as on a worksite, there can and must be a 
single architect deciding the use of funds and public resources. Only 
then, complementarity will be possible . . . .  Voting yes on the referen­
dum also means saying yes to irreversible progress toward true equality 
between the two majorities or founding peoples o f Canada; it means 
saying no to a country which, in order to promote its own development, 
will require, day after day, the dismantling o f regionalisms and cultural 
communities by refusing to recognize the will to act as a community.’’4
These reactions result from the publication of Bill C-60, a document 
which has caused serious problems for the Liberal Party o f Canada. In
*Le Devoir, 2 April 1980, at 9.
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Bill C-60, the Liberal Party set forth its federalist philosophy, which 
drew its inspiration from individualism and denied any special 
recognition of Quebec as a national community.5
T here has also been a significant evolution among Francophones 
outside Quebec, which has found expression in the publication of a draft 
constitutional reform document emphasizing cultural dualism and giving 
top priority to the recognition o f local and regional communities with 
special interests. This document recognizes that such communities need 
“a power o f initiative” to enable them to exercise certain powers 
autonomously, and stresses the fact that cultural security is a hallmark of 
the equal partnership o f Francophones and Anglophones in Canada. It 
is therefore necessary to decide whether and by what methods such 
security is to be assured to individuals or communities.
In the Atlantic region, only the Government o f New Brunswick has 
to date attempted to examine the problem o f the recognition and 
equality of the two national communities. The New Brunswick Acadians 
have, however, often denounced their government because of the gap 
between its intentions and its achievements. For present purposes it will 
suffice to note that the recognition granted in New Brunswick is 
individual and limited to linguistic status, that the methods of 
implementation are generally ineffective and inadequate, and that the 
province’s commitment does not truly extend to measures deemed 
essential by the Acadians to check assimilation and to ensure the 
economic and social development of their communities. Politically, 
therefore, the Atlantic region functions as a homogenous English- 
language region, allowing a few exceptions to make sure the system 
continues to function when disputes arise. This, to a large extent, 
reflects the situation which exists nationally, except that the central 
government has made real efforts to integrate Francophones into the 
civil service and has given them the means for social development (in 
particular, through the Secretary o f State’s programmes and through the 
regionalization o f Radio-Canada). The power structure, however, 
remains intact at all levels, so much so that expressions o f disagreement 
by the minority now take the form of territorial and collective demands, 
even in New Brunswick.
It appears clear that only recognition o f the collective rights o f 
national communities will satisfy the expectations o f these communities. 
This excludes any solution which does not respect Quebec’s desire for 
greater autonomy as a specific national community. To express this 
concretely, I would say that cultural security requires recognition o f the 
legal equality o f national communities and the commitment o f all 
governments to undertake positive measures to ensure their develop-
*The proposed declaration of principles o f federalism released by the T rudeau government at the June 
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ment. This indicates the need for a specific charter o f linguistic rights 
binding on all governments — a charter which is fair, realistic, and no 
less specific than the one proposed by la Fédération des francophones hors 
Quebec. The Charter must be supported by an effective implementation 
mechanism to ensure that justice is done impartially and expeditiously, 
without the infliction of any economic and social penalties on the injured 
party wanting to enforce his rights. In addition to a guarantee of 
linguistic rights, including the right to education, means must also be 
found to provide national communities with tools to develop culturally, 
socially, even economically, as they see fit, and to protect themselves 
against assimilation. This imposes upon public authorities the duty to 
take positive action, not only to prevent discrimination, but also to 
establish institutions which foster the development of national 
communities. This means that, notwithstanding the constitutional 
recognition o f fundamental rights, the Quebec community, as 
represented by its government, must have greater control over the 
policies which directly affect it, while in the Atlantic region, new 
mechanisms must be found to ensure local and regional power which 
respects the priorities and is under the control o f the communities 
concerned. W hether political union in the Atlantic region will be 
considered or not, it appears essential in order to check assimilation to 
find convincing expression o f dualism at the institutional level. 
Government devolution, decentralization and the reformulation of 
regional structures are essential to facilitate the development o f the two 
national communities and to establish the atmosphere o f security which 
alone can promote the unity and equality desired.
But Canadian dualism is much more than the security o f national 
communities; it also requires their participation in government and in 
the construction of the Canadian nation. This is where it becomes 
difficult, however, to translate equality into reality. We know that, in 
view of this difficulty, the Parti Québécois suggests that sovereignty- 
association is the only option which can abolish the minority status to 
which Quebec is condemned under the federal system. We also know 
that it was the treatm ent o f this subject in the reports of the Quebec 
Liberal Party and the Task Force on Canadian Unity which provoked 
the strongest opposition. These reports do not seem to have succeeded 
in proposing the establishment of viable dualistic political institutions. 
Edward McWhinney emphasizes that Anglophones perceive the Federal 
Council proposed by the Quebec Liberal Party as a “house o f 
o b s t r u c t i o n , a n d  many Francophones see a continuation o f the 
minority position o f Quebec even within the Dualist Committee, which 
would attempt, at the Council level, to assert Canadian duality each time 
this dimension was affected by federal government initiatives. It is clear 
that viewing dualism solely in terms o f the distribution of powers means 
renouncing the idea o f the acceptance by Quebecers of the federal
*Le Devoir, 29 February 1980, at 9; see also Toronto Star, 10 January 1980, at A8; Francis Fox, Le Devoir, 
4 February 1980, at 5.
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government as their own. But establishing a perfect partnership of 
Francophones and Anglophones on the institutional level seems no less 
impossible.
Almost all the study groups on the constitution have recommended 
changes in the Senate as a possible means o f establishing true 
representation of the two national communities. They have also tried to 
locate control mechanisms in the Senate to limit the exercise of the 
federal government’s special powers, such as the spending power, the 
emergency power and the declaratory power. It is therefore difficult to 
evaluate the various reports solely from the viewpoint of dualism. Bill 
C-60 provided for a legislative body with very limited powers, to be 
composed o f provincial representatives and representatives appointed by 
the central government; the House would ensure a certain degree of 
respect for dualism by a double-majority vote on questions of a cultural 
nature. The Task Force on Canadian Unity proposed establishing a 
House of the Federation which would not be legislative and which would 
exercise a right of veto over certain appointments, as well as a 
suspensive right of veto over legislation which concerns the provinces; 
the House would vote with a two-thirds majority on the exercise o f the 
emergency power and shared-cost programs in areas o f provincial 
jurisdiction. Quebec would hold 20 per cent of the seats. Dualism would 
be reflected in the composition o f the Supreme Court. The Quebec 
Liberal Party’s report placed dualism under the jurisdiction o f a 
Committee of the Federal Council; but it must be emphasized that the 
Council which is advocated is not a legislative body, but a forum where 
representatives of the provincial governments would meet to advise the 
federal government and to exercise a right of veto over certain 
decisions. This Federal Council would be composed of delegates o f 
provincial governments, not necessarily elected, who would vote 
unanimously in accordance with their governments’ instructions. The 
Dualist Committee which would deal with questions o f cultural 
consequence would be composed o f an equal num ber of Francophones 
and Anglophones with 20 per cent of the Francophones coming from 
outside. But the Francophones outside Quebec have no guaranteed 
places to fill the reserved seats in the Committee of the Federal Council, 
they have no control ov r the choice of their representatives; they have 
no freedom to exercise their right to vote; the matters on which they 
must decide are not defined.
La Fédération des francophones hors Québec has pushed the concept of 
dualism as far as it will go within the federal system by opting for a 
dualistic upper house with a broad mandate. Establishment of such a 
body is intended, not only to provide cultural equilibrium in the exercise 
of federal powers, but also to limit the imbalance resulting from the 
exercise by the federal government o f special powers, such as the 
spending and emergency powers.
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If all these solutions are still unacceptable, then they must be used 
as a starting point to induce the federal government to bring together 
the two major national communities on a regular basis and to ensure 
that its policies respect the values and priorities o f each o f them. The 
provinces also need a mechanism by which they can force the federal 
government to respect in practice the distribution of powers set forth in 
the constitution.
With regard to the composition of the upper house, it is necessary 
to accept the election of its members so as to counter the difficulties of 
the Quebec Liberal party’s formula, notwithstanding the fact that 
Canada has responsible government. It is also essential to ensure 
effective representation of both Francophones and Quebecers. This 
gives rise to the need for two superimposed electoral maps in order to 
establish a chamber reflecting the cultural dualism and the regional 
composition of Canada. WTe must ensure, if not equality o f 
representation, then a veto for each community, notably for Quebec 
apart from the Francophones outside Quebec, on certain fundamental 
matters to be specified in the constitution. This chamber must also 
exercise effectively very wide powers in comparison to those exercised by 
the present Senate. Otherwise, the new house would be merely a façade 
for a central government reflecting majority interests. The powers o f the 
upper house might be the following:
1. A 90-day suspensive veto over all House o f  C om m ons bills;
2. T h e  pow er to  in troduce bills, providing they involve no public 
expend itu res;
3. T h e  pow er to elect its speaker for each session;
4. T h e  pow er to appoint:
(a) judges o f  the Suprem e C ourt o f  C anada,
(b) com m issioners o f  the Com mission responsible fo r the C h a rte r  o f  
Rights;
5. T h e  pow er to  ratify the appoin tm ent of:
(a) all senior State officials (deputy m inisters and  assistant depu ty  
m inisters),
(b) all heads and d irecto rs o f  governm ent agencies and Crow n 
corporations,
(c) all C anadian  am bassadors,
(d) all judges appoin ted  by the federal governm ent.
6. T h e  pow er to ratify all treaties m ade by C anada with o th er States o r 
in ternational organizations;
7. T h e  pow er to ratify all shared-cost p rogram m es between the federal 
governm ent and the provinces;
8. T h e  pow er to ratify any declaration that a specific work is to the general 
benefit o f  C anada;
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9. T h e  pow er to ratify any declaration that th ere  exists a state o f  war o r o f 
real o r  ap p reh en d ed  insurrection;
10. T h e  pow er to investigate and table its rep o rts  fo r debate.
In the Atlantic region there has certainly been no rush to take a 
stand on the various reform proposals. Despite its desire to support 
constitutional reform. New Brunswick saw fit to propose retention of the 
Senate in its present form. This attitude reflects the superficiality of the 
constitutional policy of the New Brunswick government, a policy which 
demonstrates courage and an open mind in statements of principle, but 
a lack of commitment and openness in decision-making. More recently, 
the Atlantic governments have become increasingly aware o f the 
problem of control over natural resources, but no confrontations or 
external events have forced them to demonstrate imagination as regards 
institutional reform. It is sad to realize that support for true institutional 
reform will probably have to be imposed on the Atlantic region. The 
situation could be otherwise, especially in the case of New Brunswick, 
which has been facing very serious cultural and social tensions for the 
last fifteen years, although these have not yet become a substantial 
election issue. In fact, New Brunswick should now be in the process of 
experimenting with various forms o f regional government or devolution 
in order to counter the feeling of alienation and rejection which 
continues to grow in Acadian regions. Such experiments would help the 
province evolve socially and culturally and would permit it to exercise 
the national leadership expected o f it.
La federation des francophones hors Quebec has already recommended, 
in the first pages o f its constitutional proposal, that an in-depth study of 
dualism in relation to New Brunswick laws and institutions be 
undertaken as soon as possible. It has also alluded to external forces 
which might in the near future give rise to a movement favoring union 
o f the Maritime Provinces, a movement which itself should come to 
terms with the reality of dualism in the Atlantic region. It is high time 
that people other than the Acadians became concerned about dualism; 
the indifference which now exists can only contribute to the breakdown 
of Canadian federalism and to ethnic confrontation in the Atlantic 
region.
EFFECT OF DUALISM ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
POWERS IN THE NEW CANADIAN CONSTITUTION
It is essential to limit the special powers of the central government 
because the exercise of these powers may make the division o f powers 
provided for in the constitution ineffective. A Canadian federalism 
better adapted to the cultural reality o f Quebec and to the strong 
regionalisms which characterize the country can be realized through 
greater decentralization and more accurate allocation of powers, as well
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as through granting residual powers to the provinces and inserting the 
equalization principle into the constitution. This analysis will touch on 
only those aspects of the division of powers which most affect the 
dualism of Canadian society: jurisdiction in cultural affairs, communica­
tions, income security and social services.7 Before discussing these it is 
important to consider the asymmetry o f future federalism and the 
delegation of legislative powers with the right to withdraw, with 
compensation, from any shared-cost programme.
Actual needs, and in particular the needs o f Quebec, demand that 
the new constitution be highly decentralized. Canada is not a socially, 
culturally or politically homogeneous country. The cultural interests of 
Quebec may be obvious, but no more so than the enormous 
disproportion between the large and small provinces in their potential to 
assume new areas o f jurisdiction. Hence the need for a certain 
asymmetry in the distribution o f powers. The Task Force on Canadian 
Unity suggested that this asymmetry be defined by a “de facto” 
distinctive status for certain provinces, a status which would result from 
individual provincial decisions not to participate in shared-cost programs 
or not to delegate certain powers to the central government. There is, 
however, nothing which prevents a certain asymmetry from being 
recognized “de jure” as in the case o f the British North America Act of 
1867, although for many this possibility constitutes a reformulation o f 
the special status option which was debated during the 1960’s. Protests 
were made that in the event of such asymmetry all members of 
Parliament would not have equal status in discussing all the bills in the 
House of Commons and the parliamentary function would thereby lose 
some o f its value. These do not seem to be sufficiently serious objections 
however; in fact, it is possible to make room for decentralization only if 
asymmetry is possible.
Culture
If there are major problems in arriving at a consensus on the 
distribution of powers in cultural matters it is because culture is now 
linked to the idea o f national identity. Quebec’s project to preserve the 
French heritage in America clashes with Ottawa’s project to protect the 
national character of the country against American cultural invasion and 
to ensure national unity. The fact that the cultural dispute is a conflict 
exclusively between Quebec and Ottawa constitutes an additional 
difficulty. The English-language provinces willingly accept the cultural 
co-operation directed by the Department o f External AJ’fairs, the 
Secretary o f State’s programmes to assist ethm xultural communities and 
the arts, the special programmes o f the Department of Indian and
’Questions concerning the unification o f family law and labour legislation are also important with 
regard to dualism; I favour the solution proposed in the Report o f the Constitutional Committee o f  the 
Quebec Liberal Party in these areas but will not deal with them here.
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Northern Affairs, copyright regulations, and federal interventions in the 
application of customs duty and the Income Tax Act; but they do not 
understand the attitude o f Quebec which does not feel any greater 
emotional and intellectual affinity with the majority than it did formerly 
and is consequently aspiring to gain control over the above mentioned 
areas of jurisdiction.
It is, o f course, necessary to look at national and provincial cultural 
objectives to decide on the powers to be established in the future. It 
seems, however, that we will face the same fundamental problem as that 
which dualism poses for the Canadian federation, the problem of the 
confrontation o f two societies. Is a multicultural and officially bilingual 
Canada stretching from sea to sea compatible with the French Quebec 
envisioned by Quebec nationalists? On the one hand, the national 
government wishes to develop a distinct Canadian identity by promoting 
cultural exchanges between Canadians from all regions, and by offering 
to Canadians an access to the major means of production required for 
effective competition with foreign cultural industries. It also wishes to set 
national standards and thereby establish cultural facilities of high quality 
even in the poorer regions, to encourage mobility of artists and 
educators, and to enable everyone to benefit from major national 
institutions. On the other hand, the Quebec government, which sees 
culture reflected in all social manifestations, wishes to be the sole 
architect o f the cultural policies which will shape the Quebec society o f 
the future. Thus, Quebec’s objectives are also, in fact, national objectives.
In the Atlantic region, where cultural facilities are already very 
inadequate and the possibilities of financing cultural activities very' 
limited, the problem of the distribution of powers must be analyzed 
from the point o f view of equal opportunity in the cultural field. 
Decentralization may mean no services, or services o f an inferior quality, 
and increased dependence on American productions. For Acadians, 
decentralization may also mean even greater inequality. The continued 
existence o f the Ecole de droit in Moncton, the Centre communautaire 
in Fredericton, and other cultural centres could be uncertain in a 
system where the provinces have complete control over cultural matters, 
especially in the case of those provinces which lack vision in this field 
and which are beset by a multitude o f problems they consider more 
important.
These facts lead us again to the problem of political dualism: can 
Quebec reconcile its project for a new society and cultural association 
with the desires o f the other provinces? Can the other provinces agree 
on an authentic policy o f cultural development? The answer to this 
problem lies solely with the flexibility of Canadian federalism and its 
potential to survive in a very diversified society. The asymmetry 
proposed by the Task Force on Canadian Unity is essential here and 
suggests a distribution of powers which favors the provinces. This
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distribution could take the form of concurrent jurisdiction with 
provincial primacy on certain points and exclusive provincial jurisdiction 
with the possibility of delegating powers on other points. It is difficult, 
however, to imagine a system which will eliminate conflicts when 
Quebec’s objective is exclusive control over cultural development and the 
Canadian objective is unity, that is, inter-regional exchanges and the 
establishment o f national standards in particular. The fact remains that 
Canada has much more to lose by stubbornly insisting on developing an 
artificial national culture than by encouraging the special evolution of 
the Quebec society. The national government should nevertheless retain 
the minimum required to exercise its role nationally, for example, in 
respect to the archives and the national library, as well as the special 
powers which enable it to assist official-language minority groups and to 
administer, following a delegation of powers, certain national institutions 
such as the CBC and NFB, thereby contributing to an equalization of 
cultural services outside Quebec.
Communications
Canada owes its origin to the need for improved communications; it 
is therefore not surprising to see strong centralization of powers in this 
field. The following discussion deals with recently developed means of 
communication such as television, telephone and cable television, rather 
than with transportation services.
Exclusive federal power was established in this field by judicial 
interpretation; it has been extended progressively to radio, television, 
cablevision, and will soon involve pay television. In fact, the only 
exceptions to the exclusivity o f federal power come from the recent 
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Kellogg case,8 which 
granted Quebec the right to control advertising for children, and the 
arrangements made with the provinces in the field of educational 
television and telephone communications.9
The cultural, social, and economic importance o f electronic media is 
clear today, and the technological changes expected in the coming years 
with the advent o f the optic fiber have hardened the positions o f the 
federal and provincial governments. The federal government wishes 
national control to strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic 
fabric of Canada,10 to promote bilingualism and cultural diversity, and 
to develop Canadian social values. In addition to expressing the
*Attomey-General of Quebec v. Kellogg’s Co. of Canada el ai. (1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 314 (S.C.C.).
•Although the federal government has established its exclusive power over Bell Canada and B.C.. 
Telephone and aspires to extend it to the complete telephone system with the advent o f satellite relay in 
this area.
l0An Act Respecting Telecommunications in Canada (26 january 1978).
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Canadian identity, the central government wishes to promote equality of 
services in Canada and to protect certain Canadian financial interests. 
Some provinces, sensitive to the reflection cast by the media on social 
development and political attitudes, feel they can no longer allow 
themselves to be isolated from jurisdiction in this field. Quebec demands 
control over the cultural content of broadcasts, the western provinces 
wish to use this privileged means o f communication to develop remote 
regions, and Ontario wishes to participate in the choices which will shape 
the electronic society o f tomorrow and to regain its competitive position 
in this field.
An equilibrium will not easily be reached. On the one hand, we 
must see the need for centralization in the granting of frequencies and 
in the maintenance o f interprovincial and international connections and 
we must recognize Ottawa’s desire to avoid balkanization o f means of 
production, which would facilitate the American cultural invasion and 
perhaps increase regional tensions and threaten the weakest regions of 
Canada. On the other hand, it is important that the provinces, 
particularly Quebec, have access to the most significant medium of 
cultural values in existence. But how, in the Canadian political context, 
can a bilateral regulation be established, and a decision be reached on 
which government gets priority? Here again it seems preferable to 
consider a certain diversity or asymmetry in the distribution of powers, 
established legally rather than administratively, and to achieve the 
desired national standards through interprovincial agreements. The 
priority of federal powers must be retained only in the administration of 
frequency systems, since the orientation o f cultural, social, and economic 
development is primarily within provincial jurisdiction, subject to 
Ottawa’s duty to ensure that official-language minority groups have 
access to services in their m other tongue.
In the Atlantic region, one cannot help but stress the difficulty in 
developing high-quality means of production in the area of communica­
tions. It must be emphasized that the present system has not fulfilled its 
unification mandate successfully because its centralizing policies have 
created a feeling of alienation in regions far away from central Canada, 
thereby removing all credibility from the argum ent that provincial 
control would encourage partisanship and dissension. Therefore, even 
here, we must consider as preferable the division of powers and the 
primacy of provincial powers with regard to programming and 
interprovincial technical regulations. The Atlantic region will find a 
place in the system according to its own priorities and according to its 
desire to make more or less frequent use o f the delegation of powers.
Income Security and Social Services
The Victoria Charter failed because Quebec and the federal 
government were unable to arrive at an agreement on social
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programmes. This fact alone should be sufficient to dispel the idea that 
the conflicts o f jurisdiction which arose after the war have now 
disappeared because of an acceptable co-operative federalist system. Yet 
many English-Canadian authors believe that the present system is ideal 
because o f its flexibility, which is the result o f numerous administrative 
arrangements. This reflects the incompatibility of the pragmatic 
approach o f Anglophones and the institutional approach o f Quebecers, 
who are opposed to Ottawa’s unilateralism and opposed to the absence 
of definition inherent in the federal exercise of the spending power and 
in its right to make laws for the good government of Canada.
For Quebec, integration of social and income security programmes 
is essential. It must be accompanied by a decision to place all these 
services in the hands of the authority closer to the people, the provincial 
government. Ottawa feels it must check poverty and compensate for 
disparities in income distribution through a universal programme, at 
least for minimal services, and ensure transferability of benefits. It is also 
necessary to emphasize that the social expenditures o f the central 
government may represent up to 50 tax points and that they may for 
that very reason be essential to its fiscal policy.
In the Atlantic region it is generally noted that because of the 
economic and technological inferiority of the small provinces it will be 
difficult to maintain the present level o f services if the powers are 
decentralized in this field, even if a system is established whereby the 
provinces can benefit from direct grants or tax credits. This observation 
alone does not, however, explain the region’s insensitivity to Quebec’s 
demands in respect to social services. To grasp the full significance o f 
this attitude one must refer to the lack of a global vision o f society, to 
the absence o f analysis o f prevalent agents of social change in Atlantic 
Canada, and to the detached attitude towards these services as they are 
provincially administered.
I he solution to the present problem offers many possibilities, 
notably a federal programme with the possibility of non-participation by 
the provinces, a national programme defined by Ottawa and managed 
by the provinces, a national programme subject to provincial approval, 
or a provincial programme which meets certain minimum standards and 
fiscal agreements. This does not require the establishment of a uniform 
system. I'he system is already very different from one province to 
another because of administrative arrangements. Nor must national 
standards and a universal system be established to protect the weak 
regions. O ther means have been found, in other federations, to promote 
equalization. I believe it is essential to recognize the validity o f Quebec’s 
approach and to encourage a distribution o f powers which is clearly 
favorable to the provinces. The small provinces must be given due 
consideration if a federation in the true sense of the word is to be 
established.
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Although political dualism is predominant in this field, I believe 
cultural dualism must also be stressed. In fact, Francophones outside o f 
Quebec and Acadians have been very poorly served by centralized social 
services and they rightly demand personalized services adapted to their 
linguistic and cultural characteristics.
SUMMARY
This paper addresses a question which is central to the present 
constitutional debate by examining the need for Canada to express in 
concrete terms the dualism of its social structure. It is clear that 
federalism is viable only if this multifaceted question is met without 
ambiguity. The people of Atlantic Canada must become aware o f how 
late they are in recognizing this reality and must take steps toward 
reaching the compromise essential to Canada’s survival. They must 
present their own constitutional proposals and take the necessary steps 
at home to recognize the Acadian community. Historical reality and the 
economic impact of social and cultural problems will be omnipresent in 
the renegotiation o f federal ties, but we must remember that it is also 
time to present clearly the problem o f under-development in the 
Atlantic region and its isolation from central government. A new 
federation is essential; let us hope that the Atlantic region will be able to 
overcome its apathy and meet the challenge of constitutional reform.
